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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University.  
 The main aim of this thesis is to determine whether AI systems may be held liable 
for tort and contractual damages caused by their actions or even omissions. In the 
absence of direct legal regulation of AI, the thesis begins by recounting the history and 
definition of AI and examines current technological AI applications. This history raises 
critical questions as to how AI’s specific features impact tortious liability. In parallel, this 
thesis explores the applicability of existing liability regimes to AI and evaluates potential 
points of inadequacy. Moreover, this thesis will analyze the Product Liability regime in the 
European Union (“EU”) to determine whether it suitably addresses issues raised by 
increasing AI usage.  
Thereafter, the thesis examines other theories for allocating liability through the 
application of various other paradigms of legal responsibility, such as strict liability. 
Subsequently, this thesis will also identify certain scenarios where AI could enter into 
contractual obligations, or engage in tortious behaviors. At this point, the thesis will 
proffer possible solutions for adjudicating liability while, inter alia, elaborating on the 
issue of Robot Personhood, with a specific inquiry as to its impact on Europe. The fact that 
AI is not yet the subject of law or regulation raises both ethical and liability questions for 
the damages AI causes. Finally, the thesis examines whether proper regulation can be 
meaningfully impactful, but also under which circumstances regulation might carry risks, 
especially when considering its potential for hindering technological innovation.  
Keywords: Legal Liability; Artificial Intelligence; Legal Personhood; Legal Agent; 
Tort Liability; Product Liability Directive. 
Charikleia Bertsia 
07/02/2019
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Introduction 
 Approach of concept and definition of Artificial Intelligence 
 
It is not always so obvious, but AI permeates our daily lives in numerous ways. Today, AI is 
able to perform tasks which, until quite recently, only humans with specialized knowledge 
or specific license could execute. The inevitable arrival of driverless cars on the consumer 
market will transform road transportation. Virtual personal assistants will help us organize 
our working day and even suggest products or restaurants that we might prefer or desire. 
Beyond making our lives easier, AI can execute complex financial transactions, treat chronic 
diseases1, flag cyber security threats or even fight climate change. For example, in 
Denmark, AI is used to health industry. Specific machines can predict heart attacks or 
similar health problems solely analyzing the sound of a patient’s voice2. At the same time, in 
Austria, radiologists are using AI to compare numerous x-rays simultaneously with other 
medical data of the patients.3 High percentage of tumors is detectable by using AI 
tool/machines. Meteorology also benefits as AI-driven data analysis enables us to forecast 
the upcoming weather.4 It is also used in agriculture. Farmers are more and more using AI 
to check the quality of living of their animals, for example, how much food they eat and 
how much they move.5 The farmers can use the data the AI system selects and provides to 
them so that they can improve their animals’ health and condition of life6. Notably, its 
increasing and rapidly expanding potential has heralded immense private sector investment 
                                                 
1
 http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8507-2018-INIT/en/pdf 
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Andrew Culclasure, “Using Neural Networks to Provide Local Weather Forecasts” (master’s thesis, Georgia 
Southern University, 2013). 
5
 Supra note 1. 
6 
Supra note 1.. 
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in AI projects. All the above paradigms are only scratching the surface of the real abilities of 
AI. Already, some of these complex tasks can be executed without active human control or 
even supervision.7 Globally powerful companies, such as Google, Amazon, Facebook and 
Baidu have invested large amount of money in order to prevail in this innovation race.8 AI 
has started appearing in industries where no one would imagine. This new reality is going to  
be the dominant trend for the foreseeable future. 
But what truly is AI? It was the year of 1956, when the concept of artificial intelligent 
emerged through John McCarthy, an American computer scientist.9 During its history, 
artificial intelligence as a concept, has taken many connotations, with some relating to 
neural networks, machine learning and even data mining. 
The European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions10, published an important 
Communication Document in April 2018 where, inter alia, they provided a unified definition 
of “artificial intelligence”. More specifically, they concluded that “[a]rtificial Intelligence 
refers to systems that display intelligent behavior by analyzing their environment and taking 
actions –with some degree of autonomy- to achieve specific goals”11. It continues by 
explaining that AI-based systems can be software-based systems12, meaning that they exist 
only virtually, for example, voice assistants, image analysis software13, or AI can work as a 
hardware device, those are for instance, the robots, the drones and the autonomous cars14. 
Although the EU tried to deliver this specific definition, AI doesn’t appear to enjoy such a 
wide definition even among experts in the field, much less among lawmakers. The AI pioneer 
                                                 
7
 Neil Johnson et al., Abrupt Rise of New Machine Ecology Beyond Human Response Time, SCI. REPORTS, 
Sept. 11, 2013, at 1, 2. 
8
https://www.quora.com/Among-Apple-Google-Amazon-Microsoft-Facebook-and-Baidu-who-has-the-most-
impressive-work-on-AI 
9
 Newton Lee. "Counterterrorism and Cybersecurity", Springer Nature America, Inc, 2013. 
10
 Ec.europa.eu. 
11
 "Artificial Intelligence in Medical Imaging", Springer Nature, 2019 
12
 Id. 
13 
Id. 
14
 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2018%3A237%3AFIN 
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John McCathy stated that it is almost impossible to provide only one definition for AI.15 But 
what intelligence is? Is it the ability to achieve tasks? While the conceptual of AI is so vague, 
it is inevitable to have various definitions of AI. Notions of intelligence focus on myriad 
interconnected human characteristics. Philosophy tried through the centuries to deliver 
definitions on human ethics like consciousness, language use, self-awareness. Humans are 
able to learn, to adapt to situations differently comparative to other people, and of course 
they justify their choices while they have self-awareness. The law itself played its role 
throughout this process, especially in criminal law but it has been always an area of huge 
debate16.  
Other approaches try to define AI in a more practical way. Experts supporting those 
approaches claim that the concept of intelligence is tied to the ability to perform particular 
intellectual tasks. One of the most leading textbooks on the definition of AI is Stuart Russell 
and Peter Norvig’s Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach17. In this textbook, the authors 
present four approaches to define AI in a human centric way: thinking humanly, acting 
humanly, thinking rationally and acting rationally.18 This definition inconsistency isn’t 
happening on purpose, of course. Computers due to technological advantages can nowadays 
perform tasks that they previously could not. That affects the wording and concept of AI.  
Nowadays, the scientific approaches tend to define AI through the lens of machines and 
their ability to achieve specific goals. In their textbook, Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, 
utilize the concept of a “rational agent”.19 A rational agent is someone who is trying, 
logically, to achieve specific goal in the best possible way analyzing the data that has in his 
disposal. 20 However, the goal-oriented method does not seem to constitute an absolute 
problem-solver with respect to regulatory perspective. In law, the desire to achieve specific 
                                                 
15
 John McCarthy, “What is Artificial Intelligence?”, 2007, http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/whatisai.pdf  
16
 David Premack, “,INTELLIGENCE IN APE AND MAN” 1976; Olivier Pascalis & Jocelyne Bachevalier, Face 
Recognition in Primates: A Cross-Species Study, 43 BEHAV. PROCESSES 87 (1998); Rachel Adelson, Marine 
Mammals Master Math, MONITOR PSYCHOL. Sept. 2005, at 22,  
http://www.apa.org/monitor/sep05/marine.aspx [https://perma.cc/DU3G-4VP8]. 
17
 RUSSELL & NORVIG Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 3rd ed.2009 
18
 Id. page 2.. 
19
 Id. Page 4. 
20
 Id. Page 4. 
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task usually is synonymous with intention, and constituted a part of a plan21. It is 
metaphysical to acknowledge intent to a machine. Consequently, a goal-oriented definition 
has a lot of obstacles to tackle in its effort to effect a solid legal definition. Hence, Matthew 
U. Scherer, in his publication, opined that any expert system which has the systemic ability 
to perform tasks that require human intelligence can be oriented as artificial intelligence.22 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Mark Tebbit: Philosophy of Law: An Introduction, Second Edition, page.169. 
22
Matthew U. Scherer, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, challenges, competencies and 
strategies” Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 29, Number 2 Spring 2016,  
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v29/29HarvJLTech353.pdf 
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1. Entering the age of Algorithmic Society and Big Data 
1.1. Obstacles to Regulating “AI” 
 
Since the invention of the steam engine until the appearance of the Internet and now, 
the Algorithmic Society, technological progress has always played the role of innovation for 
liabilities systems.23  But, what is the Algorithmic Society? It is a society organized around 
decisions which are made and eventually carried out by algorithms, robots and IoT devices. 
The latter connect a network and transmit data while at the same time they can 
communicate and interact over the internet.  This wouldn’t be possible without the feature 
of Big Data. Paraphrasing Kant’s famous statement, that “thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind”24 we could say that algorithms without data 
cannot perform any task while data without algorithms are useless. It is crucial to always 
remember that robots are also met as cloud robots. Consequently, the handling of data is a 
very important issue as many AI systems will use them, either through its users or directly 
from internet, meaning that they will interact and absorb an immense volume of data.25   
Furthermore, while AI industry is evolving, the regulatory gap is an inescapable 
conclusion when considering the EU’s current legal regime. This regulatory vacuum has 
much in common with the initial appearance of internet. During the mid-nineties, the Clinton 
administration, alongside the United States Congress, passed the Telecommunication Act of 
1996, which specifically sought to avoid drafting laws for the internet. In addition, Section 
230 of the Act states: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
                                                 
23
 “Digital Transformation of the Economy: Challenges, Trends, and New Opportunities”, Springer Nature, 
2020;  Howard Schweber. “The Construction of Citizenship and the Creation of American Common Law in 
Illinois, 1850D1861”, Studies in American Political Development, 04/2001. 
24
 Adriano Perin. “Kant and the Mystery Hidden” in the Critique of Pure Reason: A Methodological Approach 
to the A-Deduction Argument*”, Manuscrito, 2018. 
25
 Bob Violino, Big data and robotics: A long history together, ZDNet, August 12, 2016, at 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/big-data-and-robotics-a-long-history-together/LexisNexis.   
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provider”.26 In other words, the owners of an internet platform had no liability in terms of 
what a third party uploads to his/her platform. The spirit of this framework was that 
American government should not intervene with strict legal regime in the evolution of the 
internet while the private sector knows how to lead the new phenomenon into a financial 
and technological bloom. 27  
The central idea of this policy was to let Internet find its own ways and evolve alongside 
market needs notwithstanding the possibility of failure. America’s political proclivity to risk 
embraced this market-driven policy which, at the very end, helped modern digital revolution 
and innovation and, in turn, labor prosperity and economic productivity. What happens in 
Europe suggests a different story. German economist Petra Moser had stated that Europe 
cannot stand a failure. That explains the slow technological evolution, contrary to the US. 
Indeed, Europe’s approach is rooted in a precautionary principle which broadly affects 
European regulatory processes. The European approach to technology focuses on privacy 
and data security, which had, and still does, jeopardize innovation to some extent. 
Restrictive policies in the 1990s and beyond decreased the likelihood of innovation while on 
the other side of the ocean, they are increased.28  For example, the 1995 EU Data Protection 
Directive introduced a new set of regulations for online data collection and use29 which 
affected companies, such as Google and Facebook, in deploying their commercial plans30. 
Not to mention, while firms in EU countries find it very difficult to access venture capital31, 
US firms are able to risk freely and invest considerable amount of money in up to come AI 
projects. It is notable that many private companies has invested in AI technologies the last 
years. The numbers are impressive. They are ranging from $1.7 billion in 2010 to $14.9 
                                                 
26
 47 U.S.C. para. 230. https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 
27
 White House, Framework for Global Electronic Commerce. 
28
 Tal Z. Zarsky, “The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum,” Lewis and Clark Law Review 19, no. 1 
(2015 
29
 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, October 1995/ 
www.mercatus.org 
30
 Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker, “Privacy and Innovation,” in Innovation Policy and the Economy, vol. 
12, ed. Josh Lerner and Scott Stern (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
31
 Josh Lerner, “The Impact of Privacy Policy Changes on Venture Capital Investment in Online Advertising 
Companies” (White Paper for the Analysis Group, Menlo Park, CA, 2012). 
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billion in 2014.32 A Booz & Company study in 2013 revealed that during that year, $13.8 
billion of investment dropped at the healthcare industry, $9.7 billion to electronic 
manufacturers and finally $7.7 billion to software and web companies33.    
Analysts anticipate that AI health technologies are the ones which will benefit the most 
from the new market reality and will enjoy a huge market success. According to a McKinsey 
and Company report, trillions of dollars will be invested in artificial intelligence, especially in 
robotics, by 2025.34 Market potentials are enormous; but, as the investment opportunities 
keeps expanding, it is not safe to proceed to any predictions. One norm provides, of course, 
that, at the very end, new technologies should be criticized in accordance with the humans’ 
needs and acceptance and not because of poor regulatory frameworks which create 
obstacles towards innovation. On the other hand, AI became subject to a lot of critics and 
gave rise to dystopian scenarios and tales of killer robots which destroys humanity35. Indeed, 
humanity has always been skeptical in front of grand technological progress. Fear, resistance 
and hesitation in light of those scenarios, has always constitute a first reaction for the 
majority of the community.  
There are scholars in US who propose, inter alia, the drafting of specific legislation, 
more specifically, an “Artificial Intelligence Development Act”36, as well as the creation of a 
federal AI agency37 or even a Federal Robotics Commission38 or National Algorithmic 
Technology Safety Administration39. Most of this legislation would establish a certification 
process for AI usage. At the same time, those proposed laws and agencies would also check, 
                                                 
32
 Chen et al.,“Global Economic Impacts.” 
33
 Gitta Rohling, “Facts and Forecasts: Boom for Learning Systems,” Innovations newsletter (Siemens), 
October 1, 2014 
34
 James Manyika et al., Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global 
Economy (San Francisco: McKinsey Global Institute, May 2013). 
35
 For examples, see Ben Austen, “The Terminator Scenario: Are We Giving Our Military Machines Too Much 
Power?,” popular Science, January 13, 2011; John Markoff and Claire Cain Miller, “As Robotics Advances, 
Worries of Killer Robots Rise,” New York Times, June 16, 2014. 
36
 Matthew U. Scherer, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, 
Competencies, and Strategies,” Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 29, no. 2 (2016): 393–97. 
37
 Ibid, 395–97. 
38
 Ryan Calo, “The Case for a Federal Robotics Commission” (Brookings Institution, Washington, 
DC, September 2014). 
39
 Andrew Tutt, “An FDA for Algorithms,” Administrative Law Review 69, no. 1 (2017). 
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through the regulatory process if the developing of a specific type of AI is secure and safe 
enough for the consumer and the society.40 Those agencies could also carry out an advisory 
role towards other possible organizations on how to draft safety rules for creating an AI 
software or hardware.  
 
1.2. Autonomy and Foreseeability 
 
These trends will provoke extensive economic challenges and distributions to the labor 
market41. So, which are the main challenges AI poses to legal system?  
The problematic characteristics of AI occur from its ability to act autonomously. More 
specifically, AI systems are able to generate “outside-the-box” solutions to complex 
problems, meaning that humans could not expect such solutions. There is an excellent 
example which derives from the domain of health. C-Path is a machine equipped with AI 
technology. It is a program capable to predict cancer through the examination of the inner 
characteristics of the cancer cell. 42 It was revealed that this machine, thanks to its ability to 
analyze data, “chose” that the examination of the stroma of the cell offers better cancer 
predictability comparing to the examination of cancerous cells alone.43 The accumulation of 
experience, offers to an AI system the ability to generate a solution that its initial designers, 
would be very difficult to predict, after it leave their supervision44. Thus, it is almost 
impossible for the AI’s designers to foresee how it will evolve through time.  
                                                 
40
M.U.Scherer, “Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems,” page 394 
http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/pdf/v29/29HarvJLTech353.pdf. 
41
 Aaron Smith & Janna Anderson, AI, Robotics, and the Future of Jobs/ http://www.fusbp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/AI-and-Robotics-Impact-on-Future-Pew-Survey.pdf 
42
Margaret Rouse, What Is Machine Learning, WHATIS.COM, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/machine-learning [https://perma.cc/NCV5-83KF]. 
43
 Andrew H. Beck et al., Systematic Analysis of Breast Cancer Morphology Uncovers Stromal Features 
Associated with Survival, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Nov. 9, 2011, at 1, 8. 
44
Pei Wang, The Risk and Safety of AI, A GENERAL THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE, 
https://sites.google.com/site/narswang/EBook/topic-list/the-risk-and-safety-of-ai 
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Therefore, the concept of foreseeability is crucial. If legal systems adopt the norm that 
how an AI system will gain its experience and how will it adapt it are a priori impossible to be 
predictable, it would be incongruous to allocate liability at the systems’ designers when and 
if that systems cause harm. Consequently, the person who suffered this harm might be left 
uncompensated in case of loss.45   
 
1.3. Control issue 
 
Apart from the risks generated by the non-foreseeability of AI driven systems, control 
issues also arise. Designers are programming machines in a way that “permits” them to act 
autonomously in order to achieve specific purpose. As I elaborate therein, AI does not act 
in a way that implies consciousness, but rather executes orders embossed by humans on its 
software or hardware. Nevertheless, in a number of cases where AI is capable to 
accumulate experience thanks to its initial design, the people who are going to use it, 
would found it very hard to control its “reactions” and “choices” when a non-foreseeable 
incident will occur. I cite here some examples of mechanisms which a loss of control may 
occur such as a malfunction. A malfunction can be found either as a flawed file or as a 
damage to input equipment. It is also possible to find issued of security. It constitutes a 
serious threat, that while AI machines or programs are exposed to internet, hackers would 
try to breach its security systems46. Last but not least, an initial AI programming that its 
designers had not taken all features under consideration, would create possible social risk 
after its use.  
The latter malfunction raises the most interesting issues. Usually a loss of control is not 
an outcome that a conscious designer had planned. If we lose the control of an AI system, 
                                                 
45
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 10–17 (“Liability of Multiple 
Tortfeasors for Indivisible Harm”); id. §§ 22–23 (“Contribution and Indemnity”); Calo, supra note 11, at 554–
55; Balkin, supra note 49, at 53. 
46
 See Johnson et al., supra note 3. 
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experts say, that technically it might be unobtainable. AI would able to become more and 
more sophisticated through experience with unexpected consequences. These 
characteristics led lawmakers to state that AI suggests a potential source of public risk.47 
When no human can control an AI system anymore, then a loss of general control is 
occurring. The initial objective of an AI expert machine is defined by the features of its 
programming. As mentioned above, the experience an AI gains, make it able to change the 
guidelines of its initial programming. In other words, the path might change, but not the 
final destination. Probably this outcome helps keep an AI driven system under control. 
Hence, there is nothing to assure us that an AI system, programmed to achieve specific 
goal, will choose to act in a public secure way. This is not happening because of an initial 
malfunction of course, but rather it is the outcome of the machine’s lack of consciousness 
or even morality, to accomplice the subject intent48. 
While the number of academics, tech entrepreneurs and futurists who warn that 
stronger forms of AI may resist all human efforts to govern their actions49 continues 
growing, we seriously consider that a sophisticated AI system could improve its own 
programming and hardware, exposing humanity writ large to serious public risks. If 
ultimately, this realization becomes a reality, a theoretical legal approach to this issue 
argues that an ex ante regulation would be necessary. This approach can work repressively 
as to ensure that the AI systems will always be controlled by humans. In this way, the 
public interest will be protected probably in a better way than losing the control over the 
AI systems.50 Already, there are AI systems which are extremely autonomous and 
sophisticated and are taking part at the stock trades markets.51 Thanks to their ability to 
execute commands quickly analyzing data, they are extremely useful to predict the value of 
a stock.52 Even here, AI manages immense fiscal risks that may lurk in these types of 
                                                 
47
 See Regulating Artificial Intelligent Systems/ Harvard journal of Law & Technology Spring 2016/p.367. 
48
 NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE: PATHS, DANGERS, STRATEGIES 196 (2014). 
49
 https://www.slideshare.net/WillyDevNET/the-future-computed-artificial-intelligence-its-role-in-society 
50
 See Regulating Artificial Intelligent Systems/ Harvard journal of Law & Technology Spring 2016/p.368 
51
 https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj9861/f/ai_100_report_0831fnl.pdf page. 44. 
52
 Id. 
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algorithmic trading systems.53 Although these transactions are theoretically reversible, in 
order to maintain public safety, we have to find ways to control sophisticated AI systems.  
 
1.4.  Research and Development of AI: problematic features 
 
As explained supra, it would be irrational to blame AI itself for its problematic features. 
From a regulatory standpoint, the responsibility for tortuous AI behavior lie in the manner 
AI research and development works. But, how can we define this process? In his paper on 
how to regulate an AI system, Matthew U. Scherer, describes four parallel processes that 
are usually take place to wit: Discreetness, diffuseness, discreteness and opacity. 54 Creating 
an artificial intelligence system is a complex procedure and few people have the ability to 
understand its characteristics.  This is discreetness. Also, there is no need for the engineers 
to work in a particular place, but, they can be located in different places. This is diffuseness.  
Discreteness follows diffuseness and allows the creation of an AI system not 
simultaneously regarding time, place and people. Finally, opacity reflects the mystical way 
an AI program is working and evolving, sometime, without being possible to follow the 
path of its evolution, without having a “black box”.55 
The safeguarding of the public interest has always been the compass of justice and 
the rule of law. In the twentieth century, all sources of public risk –such as nuclear 
technology, in order to be held under control by the appropriate organizations but also the 
private sector, required massive amount of capital. If someone wants to set up a company, 
he/she needs lots of money to build the necessary facilities, like factories, to purchase the 
necessary equipment and to hire experienced labor. Who would be able to provide all the 
                                                 
53
 See, e.g., Nils Pratley, The Trillion-Dollar Questions over the Flash Crash and the Hound of Hounslow, 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/ business/2015/apr/25/flash-crash-
hound-of-hounslow-trillion-dollar-question  [https://perma.cc/88QE-5FR4]. 
54
 See Regulating Artificial Intelligent Systems/ Harvard journal of Law & Technology Spring 2016/p.369. 
Published in Lexis Nexis. 
55
 Id. 
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recommended capital but the large corporations alongside with governmental entities? 
This phenomenon facilitated the regulatory processes. Why? Because a corporation 
constitutes a visible facility, it is something real out in the world (a factory, an office) and 
people can apprehend it from its physical appearance.  It is easier to describe and define 
something in law, when you can see it and perceive it. This is combined alongside with the 
people that are hired to operate a company. Regulators determine the persons and the 
entity who might suggest potential sources of public risks. 
On the other hand, AI isn’t characterized by the above features. AI research and 
development can be conducted freely meaning that artificial intelligence research can be 
done by many different people and not just via extremely wealthy institutions. Moreover, 
AO research and development does not require substantial recourses and facilities. Anyone 
with a modern computer can write a computer code and, with an access to Internet, can 
participate to AI-related projects.  
Continuing analyzing the main differences of public risk as it was configured before 
and public risk of tomorrow, let us keep in mind that the potential of diffuse by public risk 
standards plays also a major role in evaluating putative legal regimes. What is happening is 
that people who want to participate in an AI creation do not need to be members of the 
same company or any company in general. Already, many machine-learning libraries have 
been created and are catered with data by dispersed individuals who sometimes act 
anonymously. Thousands modifications can be made at these libraries on a day-to-day 
basis56. Then, it is at the creator’s discretion to build an AI program using parts of -not only 
one but- but different libraries of this kind. It is impressive that these libraries exist and 
develop separately from each other. 57 By examining the legal capacity of the person who 
participates in the creation of such a library, we notice that it is impossible to know if 
someone, either a person or a company, might use from this particular library in the future. 
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For that reason, it would be against the rule of law to hold these individuals liable for the 
future possible use of hers contribution to the library.  
These open-source projects are not the only sources of available material. 
Commercial off-the-shelf, named “COTS”, are used broadly by many modern computer 
systems. COTS usually are privatized hardware and software components.58 Software 
components are maximizing the use of COTS mainly because of their low cost, while 
ignoring possible software security issues. This type of software is used completely out the 
software creator’s supervision.59 This results in the creation of a software and hardware 
eco-system where innumerable interactions and combinations among those components 
are taking place. Some designers will create AI systems using mainly COTS, while others will 
utilize either software programming or hardware devises. This interaction may occur 
between numerous components in different geographic locations. Participants could be 
citizens of multiple countries. Not to mentions the complete absence of contract among all 
these possible participants. Even if one country sets up rules on how a person can 
participate in an AI project, nothing can be done in a global range. Large firms which intend 
to avoid such regulation would easily move offshore, choosing a country with less strict 
regulatory regime. It would be also very confusing for the companies involved to know 
which regime is applicable when determining how to manage the allocation of liability in an 
AI project.  
A final feature of an AI system is that its inner workings may be more opaque 
comparing to previous technologies. It seems unlikely that an AI system would be well 
understood, or even demonstrate transparency, in contrast with, for example, 
automobiles, which constitute one of the most important sources of public risk. Despite the 
complexity of the latter [they contain approximately 30,000 individual parts], its mechanics 
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are well understood. Manufacturers and distributors cannot easily detect malfunctions in a 
complex AI system, let alone the consumers.60 
Taken together, these difficulties complicate the ex ante regulating of AI. The numerous 
persons and corporations who take part in the design of an AI system make the legal 
systems encounter extreme difficulty in allocating responsibility among them. Hence, the 
efforts to compensate the suffered party ex post could be challenging. Courts might not 
hesitate to hold an AI designer responsible for the damage caused, arguing that he or she 
should have predict that the designing structure of that particular AI system would cause 
possible harm. On the other hand, the complexity of an AI system may make it very hard 
for the courts to assign liability to the final user, usually the consumer, if this system caused 
harm to a third party. 
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2. Concept of legal capacity in AI 
2.1 Legal Capacity of natural persons 
 
Legal personhood as a norm, had been widely analysed by John Chipman Gray in his 
book The Nature and Sources of the Law61. He argues that “ in books of the Law, as in other 
books, and in common speech, ‘person’ is often used as meaning a human being, but the 
technical legal meaning of a ‘person’ is subject of legal rights and duties”.62  Depending of 
what kind of entity we have, legal personhood attributes has specific rights and duties to 
this entity and its operators. At this point, Gray offers us many examples about things that 
have possessed legal rights at various times in history63. Temples in Middle Rome and 
churches were subjects which granted legal rights64. Of course, an entity with legal 
personhood have the right to possess its own property. These corporations are subject of 
law, meaning that they can sue, in terms of seeking financial satisfaction or either they can 
be sued under the opposite terms. The latter is extremely important and causes a lot of 
discussion among scholars, especially when it comes to criminal legal capacity. What I 
mean here is how logical is it to punish a church, for example, or an artificial intelligence 
system if criminal capacity has been attributed to it by a human law? Even though criminal 
law is beyond the scope of this thesis, this example can help us understand the oxymoron 
in approaching the legal capacity of AI.  
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Hence, natural persons own a wide bundle of rights and responsibilities65. This is 
way a natural person is the most important category of legal person.66 Jessica Berg argues 
that we live in a world that has formed in a way that satisfies natural persons, in 
comparison with animals for example, and thus it is normal that legal rights focus on this 
group.67 So, what does the concept of “natural persons”68 mean and where should 
someone focuses when analyzing this category of legal persons?  
When we are talking about “human” notion we essentially mean “natural person”. 
These two notions are treated synonymously. The key feature of a legal person is the ability 
to bear rights and duties and is commonly associated with human beings.69 Things are 
going to become more complex however, as the artificial intelligent machines might have 
the ability to make their own decisions after they gain the appropriate experience70 which,  
characterizes the behavior of a natural person.71 Under this circumstance, should the 
characterization of a human being as a natural person72 be restricted only to them or not?  
Jessica Berg argues that, “to the extent that an entity matches the relevant 
characteristics of entities which have all the characteristics of persons -e.g. adult 
competent human beings- that entity should be afforded personhood protections because 
to do otherwise would both be inconsistent and would undermine the rights sought to be 
upheld”.73 Slavery in the U.S. back in the time, constitutes a very good example to compare 
it with these features while, in the Constitution provisions was noticeable that between 
those two groups were existing significant similarities. The only difference was the skin 
color. Therefore, if we want to grant legal rights to entities which are not natural persons, 
we should search carefully for the similarity requirement. It is a necessary comparison test 
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in order to avoid possible contradictions and discrimination between different groups of 
people that possess legal rights.74  
On the other hand, if someone is a human being that does not mean automatically 
that is legally a natural person.75 The above comment is main position of Professor Frank 
van Dun who continues by categorizing the legal capacity of humans depending of their 
inner characteristics.76 In the category of natural persons, some national legislation 
includes fetuses and children. Even before their birth, or after reaching a certain age, both 
of them grant legal rights.77 Depending of their age, children have been given a set of 
rights. A human fetus is going to be born, and if a national regulatory regime provides it, it 
might grant legal capacity. 78 Chile’s Constitution provides such an example.79 It is a deep 
ethical matter to provide legal rights to human fetuses as they were already born 
children.80 There are mainly two types of categories among human beings; the person who 
is legally capable to act for him and does not need parental permission or legal assistance; 
and the person who has lots of common features in comparison to an adult human.81 
Children and human fetuses are considered to have these specific similarities.  
 
2.2  Legal Personality of Juristic Persons 
 
An entity is not a human being; nevertheless, the law attributes to it similar rights and 
duties as if they were alive persons.82 Not under all circumstances of course.These types of 
entities are for example, corporations, firms etc. The notion “juristic person” may also be 
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granted to other inanimate things as well. Most of the jurisdictions of the world permit 
these types of entities to have rights and duties and enjoy specific protections83; in other 
words they grant legal capacity to these legal fictions.  
While comparing the requirements to declare someone/or something as a human or 
juridical persons, we notice both similarities and differences. Of course, a juridical person is 
a creation of law84, and cannot recognize as a human being85. It owns its creation to 
someone’s’ will but yet again, those similarities are not enough to grant the exact rights 
and duties a natural person has, such as free will for example, or morality.86 The scholar 
Dyschkant opines that “it is the capabilities of the human beings who control the 
corporation that actually constitute the personhood of the corporation”.87 When we call 
these types of entities as “person”, we basically use fiction unless the entity possesses 
“intelligence” and “will”. Property is the first important right an entity can possess88. They 
can also enter into contracts; go to courts in case of a lawsuit, exercising their rights and 
duties. Some scholars state that a corporation status is including specific legal 
characteristics89.However, the liability of a juristic person is not always whole but rather 
limited. In practice that means that, the persons who own the corporation are not 
responsible to pay from their personal fortune the possible debts this artificial person 
might have created90. In any case, there are situations where the owners might be held 
liable. This occurs when “piercing the corporate veil” is happening.91  
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2.3 Artificial Intelligence as Legal Agents  
 
As I analyzed above, artificial intelligence is some activity which enables machines to 
act intelligently. Intelligence, on the other hand, is a quality an entity shall have in order to 
pull of its mission smoothly. The persons who created this entity have as an inner desire to 
accomplish a specific goal through its structure, and the help of artificial intelligence92. So, 
can autonomous machines be legally responsible for their actions? Based on Franklin’s 
and Graessers’ research, an autonomous machine can be reactive, self-controlling, goal-
oriented, and temporally conscious. Stuart Russel and Peter Norvig endorse this 
argument. They believe strongly that artificial intelligence is a tool which offers the 
opportunity to an expert machine, to work in such a way that simulates to a natural 
person’s brain.93 Replication of a human brain, through scientific research, is a way to 
achieve the latter.94 Artificial agents have the ability to change their behavior, 
independenly, and they can also come into contact with other similar systems. They do 
that because usually it enhances their system and helps overcoming possible obstacles for 
the accomplishment of their initial goal. This “behavior” is unpredictable for the people 
who operate them and they seem to possess a “believable personality”.  
By contrast, Nils Nillson states that AI systems can have intelligence similar to humas’ 
but also it is not necessary this type of intelligence to be as powerful as a natural 
persons’.95 We are talking about intelligence with different characteristics of a human’s 
being which indeed deliver the same result. Moreover, having free will is not something 
crucial for an expert system.96  
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There are two different views in relation to this matter: the ‘restrictivism’ and 
‘permissivism’ approaches. In sum, ‘restrictivism’ norm states that autonomous machines 
cannot be hold legally responsible for their actions while the latter argues the contrary97. 
More specifically, the ‘permissivism’ approach is rather vague and states that AI systems 
are fully responsible for their actions, and there is no exception from this. 98 These two 
approaches have many loopholes. While there is no other conceptual perception that is 
strictly humane, I will elaborate on how the human behavior is understood by us: the folk-
psychological, the legal and the scientific.99 
The first concept argues that machines, even if they provide an image of complete 
“autonomy”, they will never grant the natural person’s legal apparatus100. A machine a 
priori cannot posses’ human characteristics such as intention, free will, autonomy or 
consciousness.101 Of course, the above opinion is under doubt by many scholars. In order 
someone to grant legal responsibility, must have the above characteristics. No need to 
elaborate that a machine lacks all of these qualities, always though in a human 
perspective. On the other hand, through the permissivism spectrum, the law can be used 
in such a way102, in order to demarcate social interactions and apportion liability. From 
this point of view there is no obstacle to hold an autonomous machine responsible for its 
actions or even omissions. History of law has shown that this is possible. Some human 
beings, such as slaves in the past or children, are excluded from the pool of legal agents. 
At the same time, non human actors have been included in the pool, such as entities and 
corporations. 
Hage J., in his study Theoretical Foundations for the Responsibility of Autonomous 
Agents (2017)103, rejects this concept on the grounds that humans made a “realistic 
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mistake” in analyzing the legal concept. He observes that humans usually think of 
responsibility as requiring two things: intentionality and free will.104 According to Hage, 
the above view is wrong. What we cannot conceive is that intention and free will are not 
“real things”105 but rather things we attribute to one another. We live and breathe in a 
society where these interactions are a daily phenomenon. Eventually, if intention and free 
will are are just shadows of our conceptual apparatus and not something that is 
happening in the real world106, then, there is nothing to impede the lawmakers to grant 
legal capacity to non-human beings, like artificial intelligent agents107.  
Restrictivism is based on an apparently mistaken ontological assumption while 
attributivism is more plausible and based on coherent social practice. Would be a panacea 
to attribute legal capacity to expert systems?108 To what extent is that possible without 
having applied special tests determining whether AI has “real” intentions?  Can we 
“stretch” the concept of legal personality in order to include artificial intelligence systems 
in it? 
When policymakers attribute legal personality to people and to entities, they had in 
mind the facilitation of the daily life. It should be reasonable to attribute legal 
responsibility to anything or anyone which is not a human being. According to Hage, the 
artificial agents should grant legal personality only if the consequences of this attribution 
are desirable109. The reasoning here focuses on the avoidance of abuse of power and 
possible discrimination of the term, and there are lots of paradigms of that, such as 
international firms, usually offshore and numerous organizations110. Bryson argues, 
following the same spirit that attributing legal capacity is not something real but is used as 
a tool like in legal persons111. What we identify here is that neither Hage nor Bryson 
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believe that we should take under consideration conceptual barriers and for that reason 
not to include autonomous artificial agents in the above concept. Both of them underline 
the need for the regulators to employ utilitarian criteria if eventually legal personhood is 
granted to anything, including machines.  
On the other hand, Jessica Berg argues that we do not need to develop a new category 
of legal personhood but rather it would be more flexible to make some amendments and 
adapt the inconsistencies to the already existing. 112 If we adopt this view, indeed, an 
expert AI system, which does not belong to the natural person legal category, could be 
positioned as “judicial person” enjoying rights and responsibilities similar to other juridical 
persons without, at the same time,  having rights which is inherent to natural persons.113  
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3. The concepts of Robots, Autonomous machines and IoT-Devises 
3.1    The European legislative approach 
 
The European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 on Civil Law Rules on 
Robotics114 identified civil liabilities caused by robots as a ‘crucial issue’.115 It is an 
indisputable phenomenon that AI systems can cause harm and damages out of the way 
they operate.116  Already there have been cases where the liability of a person jumped to 
an AI system.117 In front of this phenomenon, in 2012, the European Commission initiated 
a RoboLaw project118.  The main purpose of this project was to draft a comparative report 
in terms of examining the existing legal regime in technologies in the European Union and 
at the same time, how this regime could be supplemented with special rules.119 This 
report was addressed to the European Commission and inter alia examined how the 
development of a legal regime in robotic technologies would flourish without affecting 
innovation and constitutional provisions of Member States.120 The ethical ground to 
achieve such a project is crucial and national and European legislators should put a lot of 
effort to achieve a balanced legal regime.121 
The European Commission submitted a proposal for a legislative instrument allocating 
the liability for harm caused by robots, either by their sole actions but also in relation to 
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their interaction with humans. It is a matter of transparency and consistency122 in the 
assurance of legal stability for the benefit of citizens, consumers and businesses operating 
in EU. The European Parliament suggests a choice between two different approaches 
which are described as the “risk management” and “strict liability” approaches.123 In order 
to maintain the strict liability rule, three elements are required in accordance to the 
Parliament namely: damage, a harmful functioning of the robot, and a causal link between 
the two.124 Whether we refer to “harmful functioning” of a robot or autonomous system 
is equivalent to its malfunctioning viz in case of this scenario, it is said to focus on the 
individual who was able to control the risks and avoid possible negative impacts. I also 
analyzed how difficult it might be, especially as the technology grows, to find the person 
who carries this responsibility.  After she found, another question arises. What will the 
requirements for finding a liability be?   
The Commission, just a week before the adaptation of the above proposal, published 
its Communication on a European Data Economy125 where it discussed liability issues with 
a view to IoT devises. While autonomous systems have been characterized as products 
rather than services, the existing framework of Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability126 
suffers many vacuums and uncertainties. What is more, there is a distinction between 
risk-generating and risk-management approaches, depending on whether the liability 
belongs to the party who initiated the risk or to the party who has the ability to minimize 
the possible harm or avoid its realization altogether.127  
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3.2  The Responsible Parties and Liability Standards 
 
There are various actors who take part in the creation and the operation of 
autonomous systems and IoT-devices128 and it would be useful to sever them into two 
categories: the manufacturers and the users.129 Manufacturers are all these actors who 
are taking part usually they constitute businesses, in the development, design and 
production of autonomous systems, including software developers and programmers.130 
The latter category comprises everyone who connects with or uses an autonomous 
machine after its circulation to the market.131 A contractual agreement has always 
constituted an obvious tool for the re- allocation of the costs of liability within one of the 
groups. Already today, plenty of clauses are being used by the members of the group of 
manufacturers, especially in standard supply agreements, to allocate the costs of possible 
dysfunctional product132.  At these products’ recalls are also included other kind of 
costs.133 On the other hand, unlike other professionals, like lawyers, engineers, doctors, 
courts have been unwilling to apply134 to computer professionals the malpractice 
breach.135 The absence of a procedure to get a license for being a software programmer is 
usually the reason why courts cannot apply malpractice.136 
The same reasoning has been followed within the group of users, i.e. between the 
owners and operators. Using the paradigm of motor cars, it is notable that the keeper of 
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the car has to sign liability insurance under the applicable European Directives.137 The 
same can happen in case a business operates an IoT-machine in its production process. In 
the total price of the product manufactured by an IoT-machine, it will be included a 
component reflecting the expected costs of harm caused by the IoT-machine. There costs 
might be shifted within the group of entities that operate and enjoy the benefits from the 
use of the IoT devise. In the end though, the freedom of contracts is the norm through 
which all possible scenarios will be covered.  
In sum, liability issues may arise under three scenarios: When a manufacturer and a 
costumer are connected by virtue of the sale of a product; when two parties are in direct 
contractual relationship; when the user relies on information supplied by the computer 
system.138 The first scenario is contained negligence and strict liability under tort law and 
the third deals also with negligence. In order to prevail on a negligence claim, the plaintiff 
must prove that there is “some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the 
defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered”.139  As I will analyze below, in 
case of strict liability, the plaintiff does not require showing the defendant was negligent 
or at fault but rather the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous when 
used140 normally and in a foreseeable manner, and that defect caused plaintiff’s damage 
or injury.141 
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4. The existing legal regime and the legal vacuum in international and 
european regulation. 
4.1.   Possible legal solution in AI liability terms 
 
Based on Article 12 of United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts, adopted in November 2005142, contracts 
which were formed between an automated messaging system and a human being are 
recognized as legal binding. More specifically, the validity of a contract is not anymore 
under doubt if it has been sent automatically by an electronic mean to a person.143 Yet 
again, the electronic machine itself cannot be held liable, based to what Model Law 
suggests.144 The explanatory note145 of Article 12 states that, legally responsible of rights 
and duties of the electronically formed contract is the subject of law, either a human 
being or a corporation, who initially used this method.146 Meanwhile, AI has not been 
recognized internationally as a legal person yet.147 Because of this legal vacuum, legal 
community has launched a debate. This is why the European Parliament is also examining 
to attribute a special legal status for robots. 148 If we don’t want to hold the company 
which created or the user/consumer of an AI program responsible for its actions then, 
only one solution seems to be appropriate. AI programs or machines should have a special 
legal capacity.149 Then again, we have to face the fact that, while the tool (meaning AI) has 
no independent volition of its own, the above solution contradicts with the general rule150 
that the person who govern the tool has the responsibility for its harmful outcomes.151 
When strict liability is the norm that governs the contract law, AI machines have the 
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tendency to be defined as “tools”. 152 Consequently, the person who uses this machine 
has specific rights and obligations throughout this contractual relationship.153   
 
4.2. National Tort Law as the Default System  
 
Each Member State operates its own law of torts, in other words, the law of non-
contractual liability. While it is impossible to undertake a comparative analysis of Member 
States’ laws here, it can be stated with confidence that they share common principles.154 
Consequently, a general rule of liability for fault155applies at the legal systems of all 
Member States. Thus, when due care and negligence lead to causing harm to another, or 
where a wrongdoer causes harm intentionally, this actor is liable to compensate the 
victim. 
The general principle of fault-based liability applies when a set of fundamental 
interests of the person are harmed, i.e.life, health, bodily integrity, freedom of movement, 
and private property156. This principle also covers harm done to the parties associated 
with the manufacture and the use of IoT-devises and robots. Hence, the Commissions’ 
evaluation of Directive 85/374/EEC came to the conclusion that no fewer than 18 Member 
States are lacking rules on extra-contractual liability of service-providers must not be 
taken literally.157 It is true that many European legal regimes lack specific rules on extra-
contractual liability protecting consumers from harm caused by defects of either software 
or services.158 This obvious defect does not affect the applicability of the general rule of 
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non-contractual liability, which can also be applied to providers of services, regardless the 
customer is a business or a consumer. What remains true is that there is a significant legal 
vacuum in many European legal systems towards service providers and premises liability 
on “defective” performance, rather than mere fault. Even if defective performance of 
service on the one hand and negligence in the carrying out of a service on the other have 
slight differences, fault-based liability applies to all actors who take part in the 
manufacture and use of autonomous systems and IoT devices159. Tthe legal ground for the 
above norm is the national law of European Member States.160  
 
4.3. Products Liability Directive in EU and strict liability 
 
Directive 85/374/EEC supplies European States a comprehensive framework for 
damages claims based on harm caused by products. In Article 2 of the Directive, these 
products are characterized as “movables”. In order to claim compensation based on the 
Directive, there is no requirement that the victim demonstrate fault on the part of the 
manufacturer. The recitals of the Directive emphasize that under its provisions, the 
applicable regime is strict liability. Strict liability applies to “any product”161 but it does not 
apply if the expert system is classified as a service.162 Another important issue concerning 
when or whether strict liability applies in the AI context is determining whether the 
software was defective and thus unreasonably unsafe.163 Liability without fault is based on 
the theory of risk.164 How is this connected with artificial intelligence?  As I have analyzed 
above, the AI’s activities are uncontrollable.165 For this reason, AI cannot be fully 
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controlled by humans and there is a risk element inside its function166. These are the 
reasons why AI constitutes a source of public risk. Additionally, strict liability applies not 
solely when a party has suffered economical damage but also, when a physical harm has 
occurred.167   
The concept of the defective product is defined in Art.6 of the Directive. In this 
particular article reasonable expectations regarding product safety and the circulation 
time of the product (Art. 6 (1 (c)) are described as two crucial factors required in the 
concept of defect. But, at important areas such as design defects and liability for failure to 
warm168, the international comparative scholarship suggests that product liabilities 
regimes are co-extensive with fault-based liability.169 Even in the event of a manufacturing 
defect, the Directive does not impose a pure form of strict liability, as it is developing for 
example at the French national tort law about negligence.170  
In sum, the Product Liability Directive does not cover the liability of all services 
providers and all efforts to supplement it with another legal instrument have failed so far 
in the AI context. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that service providers are 
exempt from extra-contractual liability. Service providers can be held liable through the 
diverse national legal regimes of the Member States171, where fault-based liability is 
provided. Also, the responsibility of those actors that own, keep or operate a certain 
product remains subject to national liability regimes. A directive on the liability of service 
providers has been proposed by the European Union and embraced the same principle of 
fault that has also been adopted by the national jurisdictions172. As I elaborate above 
though, this approach probably is not the most suitable to apply to AI. Although no 
uniform European system of liability is applicable with regard to the “group” of owners, 
keepers and operators, I deem critical either the supplementation of the Product Liability 
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regime or the creation of a new legal instrument in order to confront the problems which 
are about to emerge. David C. Vladech states that we should focus onto the creation of a 
new strict liability regime.173 In this way, “each entity within a set of interrelated legal 
persons may be held liable jointly and multiply for the actions of other entities that are 
part of the group”.174 Based on the above, it is possible, the persons who took part in all 
stages of the creation of an AI program, such as designing, programming and 
manufacturing, to have worked separately175. This is happening because it is almost 
impossible to predict and work on every malpractice of one party to another176; it would 
be safe, in legal terms, to demonstrate all parties are responsible in wrong-doing.177 
5. Liability of the parties 
 
5.1. The Shift from User Control to Manufacturer Control 
 
It is reasonable to assume that AI technology will progressively lead to a shift of 
control away from users and towards manufacturers. Let us take automobiles for 
example. Manufacturers are responsible for determining the general design of the 
product, including its safety features, while the user is the one who uses the pedals, the 
steering wheels, etc; it is us the user who exercises control in real-world situations and 
determines the machines’ behavior. Also, it is the user’s responsibility to drive carefully 
and avoid impact with other cars. The manufacturers are not part of any accident scene. 
Continuing this example, autonomous cars will transform the user from a driver into a 
passenger. To the extent that manufacturers do or can exercise control, liability must also 
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shift. This is obvious in cases where software cannot be altered by third parties, including 
the user, but only by the manufacturer.  
When an object operates with hard- and software together, it represents the product 
or “movable” within the meaning of Article 2 of the Directive.178 Thus, even if only the 
software was defective, in a case where AI causes harm, the manufacturer may be held 
liable because the Directive applies. The problems arise when software is distributed as a 
separate product from hardware. I already mentioned above the data/software libraries 
which have begun arising creating all over the world and can be bought and downloaded 
by an enterprise. In this case, there is no “movable” and, accordingly, the Directive may 
not be applicable. One solution is to operate with an expanded notion of “movable” that 
is neither real estate nor a service regardless of whether the object is tangible or 
intangible. Another option is to expand the interpretation of the concept of “movable”179 
towards the digital products or to apply Art. 2 of the Directive by analogy in order to 
capture “quasi-things”.180 In Gerhard Wagneer’s opinion, both options are problematic, 
while Art.2 is just giving some examples of the meaning of “movable”. At the same time, 
Art.2 is listing, at its last sentence, electricity as a movable product, hence a corporate 
asset. The problem here is that we do not know if the law-makers included electricity 
explicitly or it was mentioned as an example of non-corporeal object. In that case, 
software would constitute an even better example than electricity itself.  
 
5.2. The Concept of Defect 
 
Although the Directive does not impose pure strict liability on manufacturers of 
movables, liability may be established if a product is defective. As I have already 
mentioned above, Art. 6 of the Directive describe what a wrongdoing is and require safety 
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standards. The legal orientation of these standards stand like negligence, meaning, a 
person should take all the appropriate measures to maintain them. This definition is quite 
vague. Even the provisions of the Consumers Rights Directive cannot ensure that current 
rules, i.e the right to receive essential information181 about the product or service, are 
enforceable. Under current Consumers’ rules, manufacturers are not obliged to describe 
in detail to consumers about the relative importance of ranking parameters and why 
those criteria were chosen.182 Consumers’ expectations are often illusive or even lacking. 
Courts and commentators of products liability law in USA and Europe therefore have 
created the so called risk/utility test.183 
Defectiveness can be found either in the area of so-called manufacturing or design 
defects. In order to have a demonstrable manufacturing defect, the product a 
manufacturer puts in circulation cannot fit the description of the manufacturer. There are 
various sources of program errors in conventional software and AI, i.e incorrect data 
entry, hardware failure or electrical noise184, or “bugs”.  Experts systems are subject to 
other errors, i.e. failure of the software engineer to write clear and accurate rules. 185 Even 
though manufacturers have worked hard over the decades to minimize these 
manufacturing defects, it remains to be seen if digital appliances would be similarly 
successful.  
While manufacturing defects are more identifiable, design defects are far more 
serious. If the layout of a product is found problematic, the court applies the risk/utility 
test. Under this specific test, the product is defective if the court, with the help of a 
technical expert, is able to identify an alternative software design which would have 
helped to avoid the accident in question. At the same time, the court examines whether 
the accident costs avoided by the better alternative design would have exceeded the 
added costs of the alternative design. In other words, the court should identify 
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shortcomings of the software that could have been avoided by a better software program 
comparative to the one that led to the accident. The point is that the alternative software 
is exactly as good as the initial one but at the same time, is able to avoid the accident in 
question. If an autonomous system caused an accident which a reasonable human driver 
would have been able to avoid, the algorithm would be found defective in design. The 
critical point is that autonomous machines will not cause the kind of accidents that a 
reasonable driver would avoid.   
There is no doubt that it is very difficult to develop a system which can identify the 
defect in a system and at the same time provide an improved algorithm. That means that 
under the “optimal algorithm test”, the algorithm that causes an accident will always be 
found defective except for the safest of them all.186 The outcome will be that only the 
manufacturer with the best algorithm would make it in the market while all the other 
would have to deal with immense costs of accidents caused by their products. As 
technology develops, fair competition in the technological product market will become 
fragile. A fair solution would be not to compare the performance of the algorithm involved 
in the accident with other algorithms operating in similar products.187   
 
5.3. Burden of Proof for the Products Liability Directive 
 
The European Commission’s evaluation study on the Products Liability Directive 
reveals that the burden of proof poses serious difficulties for the victims in seeking 
compensation from manufacturers alleged to have created manufacturing or product 
defects.188 The European Consumer Organization points out exactly the same issue, 
suggesting that the burden of proof is a key requirement for the enforcement of 
consumer rights, for example to invoke legal guarantee rights under the Sales Directive or 
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to establish liability under the Product liability Directive.189 More specifically, pursuant to 
Art. 4 of the Products Liability Directive, the person who suffers the injury is responsible 
for proving the defect, the damage, and the link between the two. As if it is not already 
hard enough for the injured person to establish the connection mentioned above after the 
use of a legacy product, image how difficult would that be in case of a digital product. The 
sample of digital products in the market is yet too small to deduce safe results but it is 
justified enough to expect products even more complex than they previously were.190 It 
will probably become very complicated to analyze and evaluate self-learning algorithms 
and complex operating systems. A different point of view could argue that digitalization 
offers the opportunity to extract storage information easier for the benefit of the victims. 
Even the initial opportunity to have access in these information constitutes strong 
argument whereas legacy product cannot offer it. The German Road Traffic Act already 
includes a right for victims of motor accidents to access the “black box” of a car which is 
driven autonomously (Section 63a (3) StVG). 
There is no need to explain in exhaustive detail the importance of designing a legal 
regime whose main purpose is to ensure transparency and facilitate overcoming the 
obstacles the current regime poses to injured persons. Lawmakers should approach the 
matter rather cautiously. If they decide to sharpen the liability system, then this would 
probably create more problems rather than solving them. It is one of the virtues of legal 
systems191 and of the development of private law in general to let the system evolve on a 
case-by-case basis192. An obvious disadvantage is the rather slow process of case-by-case 
adjudication while society is urging for easy solutions and early legislation. One solution 
would be to shift the burden of proof193 with regard to the requirement of defect, i.e. to 
reverse the Art. 4 Product Liability Directive to hold manufacturers liable in case of a 
defect (unless he proves that the product was not defective). Another option is to 
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abandon the concept of defect and switch to a system of pure strict liability for 
autonomous systems and IoT-devices. Under this spectrum, the creator of the 
autonomous artificial intelligence194 will always be the one responsible to compensate the 
injured person, unless the harm was caused through the fault of the victim. It sounds 
appropriate to abandon this system provided that the manufacturers shape the algorithm 
that determines and fully controls the “behavior” of the device. Alongside with a strict 
liability system, insurance companies are going to find space to grow. 
 
 
5.4.  Open and closed systems in autonomous machines 
 
It is almost sure that the situation just described, where the manufacturer of an 
autonomous system fully controls its “behavior” would sustain dramatic changes. It is 
anticipated that there will be digital products whose hard- and software would remain 
closed to user interference. Where the user had acquired hard- and software separately, 
and even from different suppliers, it may be difficult in the event of harm to establish 
liability for one of the parties, or to even try to allocate responsibility. Who was 
responsible for the mismatch that caused the accident when the user was not able to 
interfere at the autonomous machines’ operation? Is the user who executed add-ons or 
alterations at the original software or is the initial programming of the software 
responsible for the accident? It remains innocent from the perspective of the liability 
system that the user added software that could not affect the program that operates the 
system, like i.e. entertainment software in an autonomous car. The crucial point is that 
the software that governs the safety features of the car or other device remains isolated 
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from user interference. In this case, it is qualified as a closed system for purposes of 
product liability law. 
The distinction between open and closed systems is of paramount importance with 
regard to manufacturer liability. Everything changes when hard- and software are 
manufactured by different suppliers and marked separately or the user is in a position to 
modify or supplement the safety features of the original software.195 It is important for 
the liability system to provide incentives with regard all possible combinations while it 
would be unfair for the manufacturer to hold all responsibility. 
Consequently, the characteristics of an autonomous system and IoT-device would be 
crucial with regard the responsible party in case of an accident. Everything mentioned 
above is concerned with hard- and software that remain closed to the user. For unbundled 
products, the proper solution is more complex. In theory, a remedy involving a 
combination of product liability for manufacturers of hard- and software and fault-based 
liability of users and third parties is viable.196 The Product Liability Directive is providing 
exactly the same type of regime today. The Directive incentives are applicable not only to 
end-manufacturers but also to component suppliers of any layer (Art. 3 (1)), while users 
and third parties are liable for fault under national tort law. However, the current legal 
system is based, as I mentioned before, in a very problematic burden of proof norm which 
poses serious obstacles towards recovery. The victim needs to prove who of the various 
actors involved in the accident does bears responsibility. In addition, the victim is the one 
who must investigate whether the accident was caused by defective hardware or 
software, taking into consideration the multiple combinations of the way the latter were 
manufactured, supplied, and check possible future alterations by someone apart the 
manufacturer. Under Art. 4 Product Liability Directive, the burden of proof leans to the 
victim’s side, if the facts that the court has in his disposal are not enough to allocate it to 
another party. 
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As a result, in case of an unbundled product, the responsibility must be allocated 
among various actors. Sometime, it is not only one actor who is responsible for the 
damages that had occurred. Therefore, liability must be apportioned between all parties 
engaged with the device that caused the accident, at the time of the accident. Some 
scholars have already made a more entrepreneurial proposal in order to surpass the 
difficulties imposed by the complexity of the future products. They suggest that it would 
be a good idea to hold the system itself liable, in other words to create some form of 
“robot liability”.  
 
 
5.5. Liability of Users 
 
It is impressive to notice that there is no European liability regime for users not only 
with regard of autonomous systems but of any kind of product. Of course, they are still 
subject to national tort law. As I’ve already mentioned, fault-based liability is the norm 
that applies to the legal reality of all Member States. Consequently, if the user misused or 
abused his or her autonomous machine in a way that harmed others, then he or she 
becomes answerable in damages. A simple example is when the user installs software 
subsequent to the purchase of the original system and this software is proved responsible 
for the accident. Again, under the above paradigm, the victim who suffered the harm 
would have a hard time197 to prove that it was user the one who was responsible for the 
software malfunction beside the end manufacturer. Some legal systems have chosen to 
apply strict liability for harm caused198 in the operation of an installation, appliance or 
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machine. This approach is mostly common in the category of motor cars.199 Notably in UK, 
where fault-based liability is the norm, on the 19th of July 2018, the “Automated and 
Electric Vehicles Act” has been voted by the Parliament. Apart from other sections, it 
mainly focuses on the insurer’s liability with regard to user’s fair use. Pursuant to Part 1(4) 
possible unauthorized software alterations or failure to update software by the user, 
constitutes a reasonable right for the insurance policy to exclude or limit its’ liability. 
France, on the other hand has created a system on mere involvement (implication) in a 
traffic accident.200 
 
5.6.  ePersons as “Liability Subjects” 
 
Does it make sense, for the liability system to recognize autonomous software agents 
as legal entities who may be held liable in damages? I’ve already elaborate on the concept 
of legal capacity of natural and juridical persons (supra note Chapter 2). Apart from any 
further philosophical discussion, the obvious explanation is “no” while robots have no 
assets for paying off damages claims. If lawmakers use the analogy of the legal entities 
regime, victims would receive no compensation. In this context, all the actors “behind” 
the robot liability would be protected by the ePerson’s liability. Besides, a corporation 
works as a shield against liability for the actors who created the entity, i.e. 
shareholders.201 For shareholders this regime constitutes a shield in order not to lose 
more than the money they invested into the corporation.202 In case of applying the 
principle of limited liability to ePersons, manufacturers and users of robots would be 
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exempt from liability as “they qualify as quasi-shareholders of the robot”.203 Then, no one 
of the actors would be liable as the “behavior” of the robot would no longer be ascribed 
to them. This outcome would be acceptable only if the new legal entity was capable of 
responding to this externalization of risk. It seems that under the proportion of ePerson 
liability no actor would be exposed to the equitable financial incentives as the harm 
caused to third parties would remain with the victims.204 
However, in case of limited shareholder liability the corporation is not immune from 
liability. But robots however “intelligent” they might become, will never be able to 
respond to incentives generated by the liability system. Thus, potential ePersons are 
immune from financial incentives. This fact raises serious concerns with a view to 
deterrence, even if minimum asset requirements or insurance mandates apply. Therefore, 
advocates of ePersons propose similar remedies to the ones employed in corporate law. 
They argue that the law could require a minimum asset in order for the robot to qualify as 
a legal entity.205 These funds would then be held to the robot’s name and be used to pay 
off damages claims. The essential point about entity status for robots is to shield 
manufacturers and users from liability. These actors should be protected from excessive 
liability. Corporate law can be used as a tool for the creation of a legal entity which will 
limit the exposure of individuals involved in the creation of the particular entity and thus, 
spur them to take on more risk at lower cost.206 
An alternative option is the mandatory liability insurance. Lawmakers may mandate an 
insurance scheme as a precondition for incorporation of a robot as an ePerson.. It is very 
common for large business enterprises to use liability insurance even if the law doesn’t 
require it. The main advantage of using insurance contracts as the preferable legal path of 
dealing with risk externalization is that the assets remain liquid and the victim’s 
compensation is assured. Whatever tool would be chosen by the legal system, the crucial 
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issue is as to who will be held liable to contribute. Again, natural and legal persons who 
put the robot into circulation or operate it are responsible to prove the existence of the 
mandatory liability insurance. At any case, market insurance is usually more efficient than 
self-insurance. That means that solely through the spectrum of the liability system, 
mandatory liability insurance seems more attractive over minimum asset requirements. 
Closing, the issue of limited liability should be addressed and discussed head-on and 
separately from the ePerson issue. Ar. 16 (1) Product Liability Directive provides207 a cap 
with regard to the liability of the manufacturer which is set to 70 million ECU. This applies 
also to manufacturers of robots and IoT-devices. On the other hand, the fault-based 
liability of users doesn’t provide any fiscal limit. 
                                                 
207
 Ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuteurs.com 
   
[48] 
 
 
 Conclusions 
 
In near future, autonomous machines will be capable to exercise activities that are still 
impossible for us to predict. As I have already analyzed in my thesis, artificial Intelligence 
is able to train themselves, store and accumulate experience. On the other hand, 
computer algorithms are something completely different208 while it cannot exercise the 
above functions. This ability is a unique feature that enables “AI” to act differently in the 
same situations, depending on its previous actions. Many experts argue that this progress 
stimulates to the brain’s activity processes.  
The lack of direct legal regulation in the field of liability for damage caused by AI209 has 
created ground for many different legal approaches and theories to flourish. The main 
question remains the following. Are existing laws suitable enough or legal reality requires 
a more comprehensive legal framework which would focus specifically to issues arisen by 
AI?.  
While international and national law does not recognize AI as a legal person yet210, 
how can we describe the legal relationship between AI and its creator? As I have elaborate 
above, legal norms provide that in case of damages, which had been caused by unlawful 
actions of another person, must be compensated211. The person who has the 
responsibility to compensate is either the one who caused the damage himself or a person 
who is responsible for the actions of that person, for example the parent of a child. This is 
a crucial point while, if we recognize that “AI”, as fully autonomous, is aware of its actions, 
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then it must also be liable of its actions.  AI’s autonomy in law means that AI has rights 
and duties. Therefore, many scholars suggest ascribing legal personhood to AI in order to 
be liable for its actions. However, in my opinion, it would be very confusing to suggest that 
AI systems are capable of obtaining some of the characteristics only human beings can 
have and express, like motion, morality, free will and so on. There is a huge debate 
between scholars who believe that autonomous machines can be granted the status of 
legal agents and others argue that such an attribution would remain a mere theory of law 
and would never materialize as a law forcible in the real world.212 The latter, examines the 
issue through a more descriptive and conceptual spectrum, whilst, legal personhood as a 
norm, would be able to establish a very useful law-creation tool, in the hands of a 
specialized government institution but also by the courts, with regard the allocation of 
responsibility among the parties involved in the creation, distribution and end-use of the 
autonomous machine. Already, Regulating Emerging Robotic Technologies in Europe: 
Robotics Facing Law and Ethics213 (RobotLaw project) funded by the European 
Commission, various crucial subjects were examined, inter alia, the possibility of 
attributing legal personhood to robots and expert systems. It is not an easy task 
considering that today’s perspective does not allow us to examine how far the project of 
the artificial intelligence’s might go while the amount of information the humanity 
possesses at present are not enough.   
In any case, technological innovation cannot pause its evolution waiting for the law to 
find an ex post solution, calming down the society’s second thoughts and fears about this 
new era. For that reason, I strongly believe that an always wise option is the creation of a 
regulatory regime for artificial intelligence. Taking into consideration all the legislature 
obstacles that I have analyzed in the Introduction and in previous Chapters of this thesis, 
the starting point for regulating AI should focuses on the fact that we need laws that 
control and direct the human behind the machine. Those are the persons who create and 
design expert machines, AI agents and algorithms. While addressing this issue, scholars 
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and society should avoid the homunculus fallacy, as it was presented by Professor Javk M. 
Balkin .214  
We should keep in mind that while algorithms without data are useless, these laws 
should describe the appropriate methods used by the parties mentioned above, for 
making these algorithms work. The collection and use of data is a crucial matter. 215Europe 
with its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR 2018) leads globally the legal reality of 
technologies towards this direction. Taken together, an Artificial Intelligence Regulation or 
Act for example should define, apart from its general principles, ethical provisions which 
would refer to people who set up an AI system. We should keep in mind that many times, 
people use algorithms to create categories of people, for various reasons.  
In the Algorithmic Society that is ahead of us, informational power suggests a tool but 
sometimes even a “weapon” in the hands of the various actors of the market or a 
government for reasons of public safety. What we notice here is that there is an 
asymmetry of power and an asymmetry of information 216between the public who uses 
the algorithms and the players who have created them. Fiduciaries have two central 
duties, the duty of care217 and the duty of loyalty and are people like lawyers, doctors, 
engineers who also work under a license.218  If someone has in his disposal personal data, 
usually sensitive, about their clients, then this person suggests information fiduciary.219 
Digital businesses like Google, and Facebook constitute information fiduciaries;220 hence, 
they should be trustworthy towards their end users. Apart from possible constitutional 
issues, States should focus that it is not the robot or the expert system responsible for any 
kind of maltreatment or damage toward the user or a third party, but it is the companies 
behind the expert systems. These huge digital companies tend to use algorithms and 
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possibly breach data protection rules even over people who are not bound with any 
contractual obligation, meaning, they are not their clients. For that reason, current legal 
status avoids and possibly, reasonably, to render the fiduciary norm to these digital 
businesses. 
As we are referring to “AI” mainly as a product, consumer law is vital. European’s 
Consumer Organization Position Paper and its policy recommendations approached the 
matter in another way.221More specifically, according to ECO, artificial intelligence must 
be developed and used in accordance with EU data protection rules and the principals of 
fairness, transparency, data minimization222, purpose limitation and accountability. In 
order to tackle global asymmetry of information and cover the liability matter, it is 
essential to inject much more transparency into AI systems and processes. Before courts, 
and with regard the legal regime which exist nowadays, asymmetry of information is a 
huge obstacle for consumers and their effort to overcome the burden of proof regime.  
On the other hand, tort law constitutes a mode of regulation which strengths and 
weaknesses are developed at a case-by-case basis. Tort system operates this way while it 
depends on the courts decisions. Tort systems employ a wide variety of legal standards 
and influence future behavior. But while tort cases are brought only under ex post 
situations, meaning, after the harm has occurred, courts cannot elaborate but to the facts 
that have already occurred and not proactively. As a result, in a tort case, the courts tend 
to focus on the procedural and evidentiary rules in order to verify which were the facts 
due to which, the harm occurred. For all the above reasons, a tort system creates a 
comprehensive and detailed legal regime but quite slowly. This fact would create legal 
uncertainty in an algorithmic society. I believe that on specific cases tort law solution 
continues to constitute the best possible solution. Courts are well equipped and will 
gradually familiarize with cases arising from specific past and possible harms artificial 
intelligence might caused or provoked. 
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 In my opinion, we can’t deny legal personhood to artificial intelligence but we should 
apply it only to certain and very complex legal relationships whereas gradually humans 
would not be able to intervene between the user and the expert machine.  In any case, 
time will show us problematic areas of law that right now are rather vague or even 
impossible to predict. The fact is that a new era is ahead of us and almost all areas of law 
will be affected while at the same time, new opportunities for research have appeared for 
researchers and scholars.  
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